

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KHARTO 02043 01 OF 04 050936Z

ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SIG-03 MMO-01 A-01 PER-01 SS-15

SP-02 NSC-05 PM-05 AID-05 ICA-11 DODE-00 /060 W

-----024755 051055Z /11

R 050543Z MAY 78

FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7277

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 KHARTOUM 2043

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, AMGT, SU

SUBJECT: FY-80 GOALS/OBJECTIVES AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (GORM)

PROCESS: AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM (PART II)

REF: (A) STATE 63477 (B) KHARTOUM 1999

1. HERewith IS MY APPRAISAL OF NON-STATE ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN AS REQUESTED IN PART II REF A. IN ADDITION TO STATE ACTIVITIES HERE THERE ARE MILITARY, ICA AND AID PROGRAMS. THERE IS ALSO POSSIBILITY THAT PEACE CORPS MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN FUTURE. COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC AGENCY PROGRAMS SET OUT BELOW. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT CONTAINED IN KHARTOUM A-08 OF MARCH 13, 1978 (Q.V.) LARGEST PROGRAMS ARE THOSE BEING CONDUCTED IN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AREAS. THESE PROGRAMS ARE ESSENTIAL IN CARRYING OUT OUR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING POLICY GUIDANCE FOR SUDAN. PROGRAMS ARE ONLY NOW GETTING UNDERWAY AND SHOULD BE AT FULL STRIDE BY FY-80.

MILITARY

2. BY FY-80 U.S. MILITARY PROGRAM TO SUDAN WILL CONSIST OF MODEST (\$500,000) IMET PROGRAM AND IMPLEMENTATION OF APPROXIMATELY \$200-300 MILLION FMS SALES. ALL FMS SALES FINANCED BY SAUDI ARABIA. IN TERMS OF STAFFING WE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KHARTO 02043 01 OF 04 050936Z

ENVISAGE DAO CONSISTING OF THREE AMERICANS, ONE LOCAL HIRE AND ONE AMERICAN CONTRACT PERSON. IN ADDITION THERE WILL BE SMALL NUMBER USG MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SUPPORTING FMS SALES. FOR EXAMPLE, APPROXIMATELY \$90 MILLION PEACE PILLAR PROGRAM INVOLVING SALE SIX C-130 AIRCRAFT AND RELATED SPARES, TRAINING, ETC. HAS REQUIRED PRESENCE HERE OF ONE USAF MAJOR AND ONE DOD

CIVILIAN ATTACHED TO EMBASSY. IN ADDITION, THERE WILL BE ABOUT TWO DOZEN LOCKHEED CONTRACT PERSONNEL. WE EXPECT OTHER PROGRAMS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN SIMILAR MANNER WITH MAJORITY AMERICANS INVOLVED BEING COMPANY CONTRACT PERSONNEL AND ONLY RELATIVELY FEW USG PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO EMBASSY. MOST IMPORTANT NEW PROGRAM WILL BE AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM KEY ELEMENT OF WHICH IS SQUADRON (TWELVE PLANES) OF F-5S. WE ALSO PRESENTLY DISCUSSING SALES OF RELATED RADAR EQUIPMENT AND ABOUT \$5 MILLION IN FIELD ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT.

3. THERE ARE CERTAIN FACTORS THAT CANNOT BE PRECISELY DETERMINED PRESENTLY. WE DO NOT KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER SUDANGOV WILL WISH ADDITIONAL C-130 AIRCRAFT. IF NOT, PEACE PILLAR PROGRAM SHOULD END BY 1980. GIVEN SERIOUS SECURITY SITUATION ON SUDAN'S BORDERS WE CANNOT NOW SAY HOW MUCH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT SUDANGOV MAY REQUIRE NOR DO WE KNOW EXACTLY WHAT LEVEL SAUDIS WILL FINANCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE THINK IT LIKELY THAT PEACE PILLAR PROGRAM WILL BE EXTENDED ONE YEAR AT LEAST, THIS F-5/AIR DEFENSE PACKAGE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AND FIELD ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT SALE WILL MOVE FORWARD. THUS, BY FY 80 WE SHOULD BE EXECUTING SOME \$200 MILLION OR MORE IN FMS SALES WITH TOTAL OF 4-6 USG PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO EMBASSY IN CONNECTION WITH THESE PROGRAMS. SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOME USG AGENCIES HAVE PROPOSED ESTABLISHING SEVEN MAN OFFICE OF DEFENSE CO-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KHARTO 02043 01 OF 04 050936Z

OPERATION (ODC) WITHIN EMBASSY, BUT I HAVE FIRMLY STATED MY OPPOSITION TO THIS IDEA. I PREFER, INSTEAD, MODEST INCREASE IN DAO AND, AS WITH PEACE PILLAR PROGRAM, SMALL NUMBER USG MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SUPPORTING SPECIFIC FMS PROGRAMS DIRECTLY.

4. MILITARY PROGRAM IS CENTRAL TO REALIZATION U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN SUDAN. AS NOTED IN AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW IN PART I (REF B) OUR GOALS INCLUDE MAINTAINING MODERATE, FRIENDLY SUDAN, AND STRONG MILITARY IS ESSENTIAL IF THIS OBJECTIVE IS TO BE REALIZED. SUDANESE MILITARY ASSURES POLITICAL STABILITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRITY OF SUDAN. IT ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO NATION'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN TURNING AWAY FROM SOVIET SUPPLIERS, SUDANGOV LOOKS TO U.S. (AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES) FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IN ADDITION TO ITS MILITARY/STRATEGIC ASPECTS, U.S. MILITARY PROGRAM IS SEEN AS SINGLE MOST SIGNIFICANT EXPRESSION OF U.S. INTEREST IN AND FRIENDSHIP FOR SUDAN. MILITARY PROGRAM THUS CONTRIBUTES TO ENTIRE RANGE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND EVEN ECONOMIC GOALS. PROGRAMS DESCRIBED ABOVE HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROVED, AND ANY REDUCTION WOULD BE READ AS POLICY SHIFT TO WEAKEN U.S.- SUDAN

RELATIONS AND WOULD RUN COUNTER TO OUR OBJECTIVES NOT
ONLY IN SUDAN BUT IN MIDDLE EAST/EAST AFRICA REGIONS AS WELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KHARTO 02043 02 OF 04 051022Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SIG-03 MMO-01 A-01 PER-01 SS-15
SP-02 NSC-05 PM-05 AID-05 ICA-11 DODE-00 /060 W
-----024980 051057Z /10

R 050543Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7278

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 KHARTOUM 2043

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

5. WITH NORMALIZATION RELATIONS IN MID-1976 WE DECIDED
RESUME AID PROGRAM IN SUDAN. IDENTIFICATION, DESIGN AND
ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFIC PROJECTS, HOWEVER, HAS TAKEN
CONSIDERABLE TIME AND PROGRAM WILL NOT REALLY BEGIN TO
HIT FULL STRIDE UNTIL FY-80, BY WHICH TIME AID SHOULD HAVE
ABOUT 15 AMERICANS AND 20 LOCALS IN EMBASSY. ANOTHER 35
AID CONTRACT PERSONNEL WILL BE IN SUDAN. AS NOTED THROUGH-
OUT PART I (REF B) WHOLE AID PROGRAM WILL BE IN QUESTION
UNTIL ADDITIONAL STAFFING FOR JAO IS ASSURED. AS IS TRUE
IN MILITARY AREA NOT ALL ASPECTS OF PROGRAM CAN BE
DESCRIBED PRECISELY NOW BECAUSE THERE ARE SEVERAL POLICY
ISSUES WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN ADDITION TO STAFFING ISSUES
ALREADY NOTED. THESE AID ISSUES ARE PRESENTLY MOST IMPORTANT
POLICY QUESTIONS ON EMBASSY AGENDA.

6. BRIEFLY, WE ARE CONTEMPLATING SOME SIGNIFICANT
DEPARTURES IN BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE EFFORT WHICH
WE HAVE ONLY JUST BEGUN TO DISCUSS WITH DEPARTMENT,
AID/W AND OTHER INTERESTED AGENCIES. I HAVE RECOMMENDED
TO DEPARTMENT THAT WE BEGIN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION PRO-
VIDING SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN IN LIGHT ITS SERIOUS
SECURITY AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS. SIMILARLY,
AID/SUDAN IN ITS COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT
HAS PROPOSED EXPANDED PL-480 PROGRAM, HOUSING GUARANTY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KHARTO 02043 02 OF 04 051022Z

PROGRAM AND SECTOR SUPPORT SO THAT, QUITE APART FROM ANY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE WE MAY PROVIDE IN RESPONSE TO MY POLICY RECOMMENDATION, WE PROPOSING PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF PROVIDING SOME \$50 MILLION OR SO IN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE IN FY-80. IN ADDITION WE WOULD BE IMPLEMENTING APPROXIMATELY \$20-25 MILLION IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. MOST OF THIS WOULD BE IN FORM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN LESS THAN TEN INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS THROUGHOUT SUDAN IN HEALTH, EDUCATION AND AGRICULTURAL AREA. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE AT LEAST ONE SIGNIFICANT CAPITAL PROJECT IS POLITICALLY NECESSARY AND ECONOMICALLY JUSTIFIED IN SOUTHERN REGION. OUR INTENTION IS TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO MAJOR RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT IN SOUTHERN SUDAN.

7. SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THESE PROJECTS ARE COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH NEEDS OF SUDAN AND OUR OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES HERE. AS NOTED IN PART I (REF B) SUDAN AT ONCE IS AMONG POOREST COUNTRIES IN WORLD AND YET IT HAS TREMENDOUS POTENTIAL. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BY USG WILL HELP MAINTAIN POLITICAL STABILITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRITY AS ECONOMY GOES THROUGH DIFFICULT PERIOD. AS LARGE AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS FINANCED LARGELY BY ARAB DONORS BECOME PRODUCTIVE, PRESSURE SHOULD EASE AND ECONOMY WILL LIKELY EXPAND RAPIDLY ON ITS OWN. SHOULD PRESENT PETROLEUM AND OTHER MINERAL EXPLORATION EFFORTS PROVE SUCCESSFUL ECONOMY WILL HAVE ADDITIONAL BOOST. HOWEVER, SEVERAL YEARS WILL BE NEEDED BEFORE AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL RESOURCES CAN SUPPORT ECONOMY WITHOUT LARGE SCALE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

8. AS IS TRUE WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POLITICALLY. IT ALSO IS SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT MANIFESTATION OF POLICECAL RELATION-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KHARTO 02043 02 OF 04 051022Z

SHIP AND FOR NIMEIRI REGIME IT SERVES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR HIS MOVING TOWARD WEST AND ALLOWING GREATER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FREEDOM IN SUDAN. REDUCTION OF AID PROGRAM WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS POLICY SHIFT BY U.S. AND WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

COMMUNICATIONS

9. UNLIKE OTHER NON-STATE ACTIVITIES IN KHARTOUM, ICA PROGRAMS ARE RELATIVELY STABLE AND HAVE BEEN SO FOR SOME TIME. USIS WAS LESS AFFECTED BY PERIOD OF COOL RELATIONS PRIOR TO MID-1976 NORMALIZATION. MOREOVER, USIS HAD

RELATIVELY GOOD PLANT AND ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO WORK WITH. PRESENTLY THERE LESS PRESSURE ON ICA THAN ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF EMBASSY WHICH HAVE RESUMED ACTIVE OPERATIONS WITHIN PAST TWO YEARS AND WHICH NOW ARE EXPERIENCING RAPID GROWTH. NEVERTHELESS, ICA PROGRAMS, PARTICULARLY IN EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE AREA, PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN FURTHERING OUR OVERALL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES. WE BELIEVE, AND DEPARTMENT INSPECTORS AGREE, THAT ON COST/BENEFIT BASIS THESE PROGRAMS ARE VERY SUCCESSFUL AND SHOULD BE EXPANDED. WE THEREFORE WISH TO EXPAND ICA BY ONE AMERICAN OFFICER POSITION BY FY-80.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KHARTO 02043 03 OF 04 051030Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SIG-03 MMO-01 A-01 PER-01 SS-15
SP-02 NSC-05 PM-05 AID-05 ICA-11 DODE-00 /060 W
-----025022 051057Z /10

R 050543Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7279

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 KHARTOUM 2043

10. ICA PROGRAMS SUPPORT U.S. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN SUDAN. WE WISH PLACE PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON EXCHANGE PROGRAM AND BELIEVE PROGRAM SHOULD GROW CONSIDERABLY. WE ENVISAGE AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM IN THE \$300-350,000 AREA, AND THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR APPROXIMATELY HALF THE ICA BUDGET IN SUDAN, ALTHOUGH FIGURE DOES NOT INCLUDE CENTRALLY FUNDED PROGRAMS. SUCH A PROGRAM, THOUGH STILL MODEST, WOULD MORE APPROPRIATELY REFLECT IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SUDAN AND OVERALL SCOPE AND CHARACTER OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT WOULD REQUIRE

ADDITIONAL
OFFICER TO HELP ADMINISTER EXPANDED PROGRAM.
THOUGH SMALLER THAN EITHER MILITARY OR AID PROGRAMS, ICA PROGRAMS REACH KEY LEADERS AND GROUPS IN COUNTRY. REDUCTION OF ICA PROGRAMS WOULD HAMPER OVERALL COMMUNICATIONS EFFORT, BOTH IN INFORMATION AND CULTURAL AREAS.
CONSIDERING SMALL
SIZE OF PROGRAM, RELATIVELY SMALL SAVINGS THAT COULD BE
REALIZED FROM PROGRAM REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE

WORTH COSTS IN TERMS OF OPPORTUNITIES LOST. MOREOVER, REDUCTION IN ICA PROGRAMS WOULD NOT GO UNNOTICED AND AS WITH OTHER POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS NEGATIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL. CONVERSELY, RELATIVELY SMALL INCREMENTS IN ICA RESOURCES IN TERMS OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL OR FINANCIAL RESOURCES COULD BE EXPECTED PAY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KHARTO 02043 03 OF 04 051030Z

CONSIDERABLE DIVIDENDS AND WOULD BE WELL WORTH ADDED COSTS.

OTHER USG AGENCIES

11. THERE IS A VIEW THAT SUDAN IS LOGICAL PLACE TO MARRY ARAB FINANCES AND U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. IN ONE SENSE THIS CHARACTERIZATION COULD BE APPLIED TO U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HERE. IT ALSO HAS BEEN APPLIED IN PRIVATE SECTOR WHERE U.S. FIRMS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN BY ARAB COMPANIES OR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND DONORS. FROM TIME TO TIME WE HAVE DISCUSSED SUCH PROGRAMS INVOLVING U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY AND FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, AMONG OTHERS. TO DATE NONE OF THESE PROGRAMS HAS MOVED BEYOND DISCUSSION STAGE. ALTHOUGH POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT ONE OR ANOTHER IDEA MAY MATURE BY 1980, UNTIL NOW RESULTS IN THIS AREA HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING. FOR RECORD, HOWEVER, WISH TO NOTE OUR GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE IDEA OF REIMBURSABLE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AS BEING CONSISTENT WITH OVERALL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

12. ALSO NOT YET ACTIVE HERE IS PEACE CORPS, BUT AS OF SPRING 1978, WE THINK THERE BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE THAT SUDANGOV WILL REQUEST PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR ACTION AGENCY HELD TALKS WITH SEVERAL SENIOR OFFICIALS IN APRIL AND INDICATED WILLINGNESS PROVIDE PCVS TO SUDAN. IF SUDANGOV DOES MAKE REQUEST, I WILL SUPPORT IT. IF REQUEST IS MADE RELATIVELY SOON, WE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO ARRIVAL FIRST VOLUNTEERS IN 1980. THIS, OF COURSE, WILL REPRESENT MAJOR NEW PROGRAM AND AS INDICATED IN PART I (REF B) WILL ADD TO OVERALL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FROM JAO. HOWEVER, PEACE CORPS PROGRAM AIMED AT ASSISTING POOR WOULD BE COMPLETELY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KHARTO 02043 03 OF 04 051030Z

CONSISTENT WITH U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES HERE AND WOULD

NICELY COMPLEMENT AID PROGRAM.

13. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 4, PART II REF A, IT IS INDEED DIFFICULT TO DEFINE LEAST IMPORTANT TEN PERCENT OF EACH AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES. IN MILITARY AREA, IF NEED BE, IMET PROGRAM COULD BE REDUCED AND WE WOULD LET SUDANGOV DECIDE WHICH COURSES IT WISHED FOREGO. IN SOME INSTANCES ONE PLACE FOR SUDAN WOULD HAVE TOSUFFICE INSTEAD OF TWO. IN AID AREA OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO MAKE REDUCTIONS ACROSS THE BOARD RATHER THAN DROP INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS. SIMILARLY IN ICA WE WOULD REDUCE EACH COMPONENT OF PROGRAM, WITH EOTHASIS, PERHAPS, IN MOTION PICTURE AREA.

14. SINCE VARIOUS PROGRAMS ARE ONLY JUST BEGINNING WE LONG WAY FROM BLOATED STAFFS THAT HAVE OCCURRED ELSEWHERE IN PAST. FULLY AGREE SAME COULD HAPPEN HERE AND THAT IS ONE REASON WHY I HAVE OPPOSED ESTABLISHMENT SEVEN-PERSON ODC HERE. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, OVER-STAFFING AND MARGINAL PROGRAMS ARE NOT RPT NOT PROBLEMS. AS AID PROGRAM EXPANDS THERE WILL BE GOOD BALANCE OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS. I AM SATISFIED THAT NON-STATE PROGRAMS HERE AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED ARE APPROPRIATE TO OUR OVERALL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH SCOPE AND CHARACTER SUDAN-U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KHARTO 02043 04 OF 04 051013Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SIG-03 MMO-01 A-01 PER-01 SS-15
SP-02 NSC-05 PM-05 AID-05 ICA-11 DODE-00 /060 W
-----024937 051058Z /11

R 050543Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7280

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 KHARTOUM 2043

15. IN SUMMARY, NON-STATE AGENCIES, NOTABLY MILITARY AND AID, HAVE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CARRYING OUT TANGIBLE PROGRAMS THAT HAVE RESULTED FOLLOWING DECISIONS IN 1976 AND 1977 TO NORMALIZE REJLATIONS, RESUME PROGRAMS AND ACCELERATE SUPPORT FOR SUDAN. THEIR PROGRAMS, THEREFORE, ARE CENTRAL TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND OUR EFFORTS ACHIEVE AGREED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN SUDAN. ACTUAL EXECUTION OF PROGRAMS ONLY NOW GETTING UNDERWAY AND THEY

LIKELY TO BE IN FULL STRIDE BY FY-80. THUS, DISCUSSION
ABOUT REDUCTIONS HAS SOMEWHAT UNREALISTIC QUALITY TO IT.
IF ANYTHING NUMBER OF DOD, AID AND PERHAPS PEACE CORPS
PERSONNEL WILL INCREASE DRAMATICALLY BY FY-80. SIMILARLY,
IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO INCREASE BASIC SUPPORT ELEMENTS
OF EMBASSY SO THESE PROGRAMS CAN BE ADMINISTERED EFFECTIVELY.
SINCE 1976 U.S. POLICY TOWARD SUDAN HAS MOVED FIRMLY
TOWARD FRIENDLIER RELATIONS BASED ON WIDE-RANGING MUTUAL
INTERESTS. AS A FORMER AMBASSADOR HERE ONCE OBSERVED,
SUDAN IS NOT JUST ANOTHER LDC, AND THIS HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY APPARENT TO WASHINGTON IN LAST TWO YEARS.
WE CONSIDER THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT POLITICAL,
STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS THAT WILL BE WELL SERVED
BY COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH SUDAN AND THIS JUDGMENT
LIES BEHIND POLICY DECISIONS OF PAST TWO YEARS. THUS,
MOVEMENT HAS BEGUN. REDUCTIONS IN STAFF AND RESOURCES
PROVIDED TO THIS MISSION WOULD RUN EXACTLY COUNTER TO
THIS MOVEMENT AND WOULD CONTRADICT POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KHARTO 02043 04 OF 04 051013Z

AT HIGHEST LEVEL USG.
BERGUS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MANAGEMENT, REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 may 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978KHARTO02043
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780192-0090
Format: TEL
From: KHARTOUM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780590/aaaacyjb.tel
Line Count: 412
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: afd6cba3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 63477, 78 KHARTOUM 1999
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2783165
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FY-80 GOALS/OBJECTIVES AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (GORM) PROCESS: AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM (PART II)
TAGS: PEPR, AMGT, SU
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/afd6cba3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014